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Negative electricity market prices
Recent observations show that European electricity 
market prices turn negative when high shares of inflexible 
generation hit a low demand. The increasing share of 
Renewable Energy Sources for Electricity (RES-E), such as 
wind and solar Photovoltaic Power (PV), is an important 
driver due to the intermittency of its energy source1.  The 
objective of the factsheet is to explain this phenomena 
of negative prices, as well as the behaviour of electricity 
markets with high shares of RES-E.
Table 1 represents the national statistics of leading EU member 
states in terms of the installed capacities of wind and solar 
power by the end of 2012. In Belgium, both technologies 
accounted for 3.4% and 1.9%, respectively in terms of average 
electric energy penetration. Concerning wind power integration, 
lessons can be learned today from leading countries such as 
Denmark (30.0%), Portugal (20.4%), Spain (18.2%) and Ireland 
(15.6%). For solar power integration, leading countries are Italy 
(5.7%), Germany (5.1%) and Spain (4.3%).
In terms of power ratios, these shares of variable RES-E 
may account for “maximum penetrations” exceeding 100% 
of the minimum demand. Table 1 shows how this may 
already be the case for wind power in Denmark (200.0%), 
Portugal (127.3%), Spain (126.6%) and Ireland (100.0%), 
when expressing the installed capacity relative to the 
minimum consumption level. The maximum penetration is 
an indicator for the need for curtailing part of the 
renewable capacity, for export or for storage. Meanwhile, the 
shares of RES keep on growing under the effect of policy targets 
Table 1: Installed capacity (GW) and annual electricity generation (TWh) of wind and PV in selected European countries by the end of 2012 
(based on data published by ENTSO-E 2013)
1 average electric energy penetration: annual electricity generation in terms of total consumption;  2 max penetration: installed capacity in 
terms of minimum consumption; 3 solar in Spain includes 2.0 GW Concentrated Solar Power (CSP)
wind solar (mostly PV3)
GW TWh penetration [%] GW TWh penetration [%]
mean1 max2 mean1 max2
Denmark 4.2 10.3 30.0 200.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 19.0
Por tugal 4.2 10.0 20.4 127.3 0.2 0.4 0.8 6.1
Spain 22.4 48.5 18.2 126.6 6.1 11.6 4.3 34.5
Ireland 1.6 4.0 15.6 100.0 n.a. 0.0 0.0 n.a.
Germany 30.9 46.0 8.5 96.3 32.8 27.6 5.1 102.2
Italy 8.1 13.3 4.1 38.6 16.4 18.6 5.7 78.1
Belgium 1.3 2.9 3.4 21.0 2.5 1.6 1.9 40.3
1 Intermittency refers to the limited controllability and partial predictability 
of a generation resource.
2 Energy Institute KU Leuven “Factsheet Security of Supply” September 
25, 2013 http://www.kuleuven.be/ei/
and declining investment costs. For instance in Belgium, wind 
power and PV have grown respectively up to 1.7 and 3.0 GW 
towards the beginning of 2014.
Historically, system operators, regulators and policy 
makers were mainly concerned about upward adequacy, 
i.e. the ability of power systems to meet peak demand 
and avoid demand shedding. This topic remains certainly 
relevant today, especially where power systems face 
decommissioning of older power plants, in countries where a 
nuclear phase-out is decided, while existing units with high 
marginal cost (such as gas-fired generating units) face problems 
maintaining their profitability. In combination with intermittent 
RES-E, this leads to an increased risk for periodical shortages2. 
However, attention is also needed for downward adequacy, 
i.e. the ability of the system to cope with low demand periods. 
Recent events have shown that system inflexibilities may lead 
to periods with excess power, challenging the operation 
of the power system. These inflexibilities include renewable 
generation dealing with priority dispatch and production 
support mechanisms, conventional generation facing 
techno-economic limitations in output variations, and must- 
run conditions of power plants for system security reasons.
This issue is referred to as the “incompressibility of power 
systems” and is recently observed in Central Western 
European electricity markets such as Germany, France and 
Belgium, with hours showing negative electricity prices 
on day-ahead, intra-day and balancing markets. Economic 
theory imposes that low demand together with a large 
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supply at nearly-zero marginal cost results in lower market 
prices. However, events with negative prices are less 
straightforward as these price levels translate into 
generating units which are willing to pay for the 
consumption of electrical energy.
Negative day-ahead market prices
Figure 1 represents the theoretical framework of the impact of 
renewable power with low variable cost in day-ahead wholesale 
electricity markets. In this market, electricity is traded and 
positions are taken for the next day, based on the market 
expectations. The supply curve is represented by a merit order 
of generation technologies, representing their marginal 
generation cost. Usually, but depending on the actual fuel costs, 
these generation technologies are categorised as base load (e.g. 
nuclear and coal-fired power plants), mid load (e.g. combined-
cycle gas turbines) and peak load (e.g. open-cycle gas turbines, 
diesel engines). The price is set by the intersection of the 
demand curve and the supply curve. In Figure 1 (left), it is 
shown that the expected demand impacts the price of 
electricity. A low demand does not require the activation of 
the more expensive power plants and results in a lower price. 
Furthermore, when a certain injection of RES-E is predicted with 
an almost zero marginal cost, the supply curve is shifted to the 
right, lowering the electricity prices (Figure 1, right), referred to as 
the merit-order effect. This results in price volatility as these RES-E 
are characterised by an intermittent availability.
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Figure 2: Practical merit order without (left) and with renewable energy sources (right); RESDG expected renewable generation production of 
distributed nature; F flexible; NF non-flexible
Figure 1: Theoretical merit order without (left) and with renewable energy sources (right)
However, due to technical constraints of power systems, the 
supply curve may look different in reality. Certain generation 
technologies such as older nuclear power plants in some 
countries are not designed for short-term output variations 
(referred to as inflexible base load). Furthermore, part of the 
conventional power plants has to remain on-line for security 
reasons, such as providing reserve capacity, paid for by the TSO 
(referred to as must-run generation) (See Figure 2, left). This issue 
becomes even more important with the increasing share of RES-E 
facing prediction errors and additional reserve capacity 
requirements. This may result in negative price bids, in order to 
guarantee the acceptance of this bid. Furthermore, RES which 
actively participate in the market, can bid negative prices due 
to the presence of support mechanisms. They are willing to 
generate as long as the negative electricity price is compensated 
by the production support under the form of feed-in tariffs or 
green certificates (Figure 2, right). Part of the operation of RES 
which is market-price insensitive due to priority dispatch policies 
or control difficulties following its distributed generation (DG) 
nature, as for instance local PV generation in Belgium, are treated 
as negative demand, shifting the demand curve to the left 
(Figure 2, right).
This explains how prices can turn negative when facing low 
demand together with high RES injections. It is currently observed 
that negative price periods on European day-ahead markets 
increase in frequency. In the last week of December 2012, a 
low demand in the holiday period together with a high wind 
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Figure 3: Belgian Day-Ahead Market Operation June 15-16 June 2013 
(data: Elia System Operator and Belpex Power Exchange)
situation resulted in negative prices on the day-ahead hourly 
electricity market for Germany and Austria (EPEX Phelix). 
Negative day-ahead prices down to -222 €/MWh were registered 
during the night of December 25th, and this problem reoccurred 
multiple times during the rest of that week.
A similar event occurred in Central-Western European region, 
i.e. Belgium, Germany and France in the weekend of June 15-16, 
2013 facing a regional low industrial consumption on Sunday, low 
residential consumption on mild weather, and abundant inflexible 
generation driven by wind, PV, hydro and nuclear3. In France, a daily 
average price of -41 €/MWh and -20€/MWh (EPEX), respectively, 
for base and peak demand periods on the day-ahead market, and 
minima down to -200 €/MWh during the night were observed. As 
the day-ahead electricity markets of France, Germany and Belgium 
are coupled, these prices are buffered and spread over the region, 
constrained by the available interconnection capacity. This was, for 
instance, the case for the same weekend discussed here, where 
average prices in Germany/Austria (EPEX Phelix) fell to roughly 
-20 €/MWh and  3€/MWh for respectively peak and base 
demand periods, and minima down to -100 €/MWh.
Prices also turned negative on the Belgian day-ahead market 
(Belpex) that same weekend as the price  hit a low of  200 €/MWh 
(Figure 3). The residual Belgian demand seen by the market 
participating generating units is low due to low demand and high 
RES penetration. This demand incorporates distributed wind and 
PV, which is treated as negative demand. A minimum demand of 
6.2 GW was observed on Sunday, combined with a maximum of 
2.6 GW of wind and PV on Saturday. The negative price peaks 
are explained by the must-run conditions of conventional power 
plants, the available nuclear capacity of 5.4 GW, and constrained 
export capabilities.  Events where day-ahead market prices turn 
negative are still rare: in France in 2012, 56 hours with negative 
prices were observed in the French day-ahead market (EPEX), 
and these occurred over 15 days. In 2012 and 2013 in Belgium 
(Belpex), 7 and 15 hours were observed, respectively, in both 
cases for 3 days. As they are linked to low net demand periods, 
such events are expected to increase in frequency.
3 APX, Belpex, EPEX SPOT - Joint Statement on negative prices in Belgium 
and France on 16 June 2013, http://www.belpex.be/
Negative intra-day market prices
In European power systems, market players are able to adapt their 
positions intra-day, based on updated market expectations. This is 
particularly useful for intermittent RES-E, relying on higher forecast 
accuracy closer to real time. This market is well represented in 
European power exchanges, matching bids on a continuous basis. 
In general, intra-day markets follow the same economic principles 
as day-ahead markets, although liquidity may be lower and prices 
more volatile. This is explained by technical limitations of 
generating units to alter their injections closer to real time. A 
trend towards European regional market coupling is present, 
which is expected to increase market liquidity. Prices in the 
intra-day market are related to the day-ahead prices and real- 
time balancing-market-price expectations.
In the case of December 25th, 2012, EPEX intra-day market prices 
were found to hit a low of  500 €/MWh in Germany/Austria. 
Also on June 15-16th, 2013, negative prices were observed on 
Belgian, French and German intra-day markets. In the French intra-
day  market (EPEX) in 2012, 41 hours with negative prices were 
observed, which occurred during 10 days. In the Belgian intra-day 
market (Belpex) in 2012 and 2013, 1 and 26 hours during 1 and 
10 days were identified, respectively. It is to be noted that the 
intra-day market in Belgium remains relatively small and illiquid 
compared to the day-ahead market markets.
Negative balancing market prices
Real-time deviations from the scheduled market positions are 
dealt with on the balancing market. Historically, such deviations 
include unplanned power-plant outages and unexpected demand 
variations. With the increasing penetration of intermittent RES-E, 
also prediction errors result in an additional demand for balancing 
actions. Due to its strong relation to system security, this market 
is coordinated by the TSO. It contracts reserve capacity which is, 
today, mainly procured from conventional power plants, and can 
be quickly activated in real-time to cover system imbalances. In 
principle, a minimum amount is contracted by means of long-term 
contracts in order to keep a minimum capacity available. 
Furthermore, market players can offer additional capacity by 
means of short-term contracts which are closed one day before 
the real-time. Together, this results in a merit-order representing 
the activation cost of reserve capacity (Figure 4, left). 
When activating upward reserves for the situation in which 
the system faces an instantaneous power shortage (negative 
imbalance), this results in a positive marginal price (MP) for 
balancing, and the TSO pays the Balancing Service Provider (BSP) 
(Figure 4, left). This activation price covers, inter alia, the fuel cost 
of increasing the output of the power plant. In Belgium, upward 
reserve capacity is provided with different mechanisms: the 
system imbalance is netted with other control zones by means 
of International Grid Cooperation and Control (IGCC). Upward 
fast-response secondary reserves (R2) include contracted and 
possible free bids from power plants. The slow-response tertiary 
reserves (R3) contain contracted and free bids from power plants, 
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contracted bids from interruptible demand, contracted bids 
from resources on the distribution level (as of 2014), and a non- 
guaranteed emergency capacity from other TSOs. 
In contrast to the upward reserve, the downward activation price 
can be positive or negative. Usually, the price is negative and refers 
to a payment of the BSP towards the TSO. This is explained by 
the fuel savings following the output reduction of a power plant. 
However, market players may also bid positive activation prices, i.e. 
willing to be paid for the activation. This may compensate power 
plants facing expensive shut-down costs, or renewable power 
plants losing production support. In this case, the imbalance 
settlement tariff becomes negative and money flows represented 
in Figure 4 (right) are reversed. In Belgium, downward reserve 
capacity is provided by means of the IGCC mechanism, secondary 
reserve, free bids and inter-TSO emergency. 
The reservation and activation of reserve capacity are referred to 
as the procurement side of the balancing market, i.e. the reserve 
market. Reservation costs are included in the transmission 
tariffs and activation costs are transferred to the responsible 
market players by means of the imbalance settlement mechanism. 
In 2012, a one-price settlement system was introduced in 
Belgium (Figure 4, right). This represents the settlement side of the 
balancing market resulting in a price quoted on this market every 
quarter of an hour. An additional component is added when facing 
large imbalances, pulling apart the MDP and MIP price, and 
providing an additional incentive for BRPs to balance their 
position.  Although the price is unknown in real-time, estimates 
can be made from the real-time system imbalance, the available 
capacity and marginal price published by the TSO. Balancing 
Responsible Parties (BRPs) can actively adapt their positions in 
order to minimise their imbalance volume or cost.
A first example of negative imbalance prices can be found in 
Germany where on February 10, 2013, PV injections were 
underestimated due to melting snow. This resulted in a downward 
reserve activation and negative imbalance prices down to -218 €/
MWh. When studying time series of the Belgian imbalance tariffs 
for 2012 and 2013, it is found that negative prices are recorded 
9.1% and 6.6% of the time, while minima were registered at - 
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A positive upward activation price and negative downward activation price is 
translated into a positive settlement tariff  (MIP and MDP). In case of a positive 
downward activation price, the settlement tariff is negative and money flows are 
reversed.
Figure 4: Bid ladders for activating reserve capacity (left): positive (negative) available reserve capacity represents upward (downward) 
reserve capacity; positive (negative) activation price represents a cash flow from TSO (BSP) to BSP (TSO); downward reserve capacity can be 
bid at both negative as positive price. Imbalance settlement mechanism (right): MDP marginal decremental price; MIP marginal incremen-
tal price
Figure 5: Imbalance settlement tariff on Belgian electricity market 
on April 1, 2013; POS positive BRP portfolio imbalance tariff (excess 
energy), NEG negative BRP portfolio imbalance tariff (shortage). A 
postive tariff means that the BRP with a negative imbalance pays 
the TSO and the BRP with positve imbalance is paid by the TSO. This 
is reversed in case of a negative tariff.
238 €/MWh and -313 €/MWh, respectively. An example of 
negative Belgian imbalance prices is found on April, 1, 2013 (Figure 
5): large negative activation prices were recorded in the day-time, 
indicating an excess of power and providing a strong market 
incentive to reduce injection or increase off-take. This event is 
again caused by incompressibility where downward flexibility is 
limited in periods with low demand, resulting in negative pricing 
when facing high positive system imbalances. 
When studying the day-ahead market (Figure 6, left), it is 
confirmed that expected residual demand is relatively low 
resulting in lower prices during the day. It is noticed how this 
coincides with high values of predicted RES production during the 
day. Part of this production, i.e. the injections at the distribution 
level, is already included in the demand. A low demand results 
in fewer power plants scheduled, or scheduled at minimum load, 
resulting in little or expensive flexibility to cope with positive 
forecast errors. This translates into expensive downward reserve 
capacity. But evidently, and unfortunately, a large positive imbalance 
is correlated with the demand forecast error, the RES forecast 
error and the final PV injections (Figure 6, right). The main source 
of this imbalance is PV is integrated in the distribution system 
by means of ‘netmetering’, i.e. without direct metering of the PV 
injections, and therefore difficult to monitor, predict or control. 
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Figure 7: Upward (positive) and downward (negative) regulation 
volume on April 1, 2013
Figure 6: Day-ahead market operation (left) and system imbalance 
(right) on April 1, 2013
This issue calls for measures in order to create market 
participation or at least well-functioning prediction models.
The large imbalance requires large amounts of downward 
reserve capacity to be activated (Figure 7). First, the imbalance 
is netted with the IGCC after which the available secondary 
reserve (R2) is activated. This capacity is limited to 140 MW 
and additional reserve capacity is to be activated resulting from 
the free bids (Bids-) and the last resort inter-TSO 
cooperation (R3). However, the free bids are limited and 
expensive, as downward flexibility remains limited due to the 
low demand while facing large shares of inflexible generation. 
This explains the negative imbalance settlement tariffs, 
resulting from the activation of large amount of downward 
reserve capacity far in the merit order. As one goes fur ther in 
the merit order, activation prices increase, which explains the 
negative prices.
Need for downward flexibility
The intermittency of RES translates into volatile market prices 
as well as negative prices during periods where high RES-E 
injections hit a low demand. In the day-ahead market, this is driven 
by expected injections, while in real-time markets, this is driven by 
unexpected injections due to prediction errors.
There are three major reasons why one can end up with 
negative prices on these markets. First of all, high production 
subsidies result in a distorted price responsiveness of RES-E 
technologies, i.e. renewable generating units are willing to pay to 
inject power. Furthermore, a large part of the RES-E currently 
connected to the distribution system lack control capabilities and 
right market incentives to react upon negative market prices. 
Therefore, measures  are needed to improve the active market 
participation of renewable generation and achieve a cost- 
efficiency and reliable operation of the system. 
Second, the negative prices result from the limited flexibility of 
the conventional power plants. This may result from 
technological limitations such as start-up, shut-down and 
output ramping constraints. Negative prices induce flexibility on 
the short- and long-term by means of incentivising  the output 
control of must-run conventional generation sources, e.g. nuclear 
power, or the reduction of minimum run levels of power plants, 
e.g. CCGT. Furthermore, these negative prices may facilitate 
implementation of new sources of flexibility such as demand- 
response or storage technologies. 
Finally, negative prices occur from must-run conditions of 
conventional power plants in order to meet system security 
standards. A major challenge is the increasing need of reserve 
capacity to balance the prediction errors of RES-E. It is 
therefore important to counter this need with improving 
forecast tools, or optimal sizing and allocation methodologies. 
Furthermore, it should be investigated how an increasing share of 
the reserve services can be provided with alternative technologies 
such as storage, demand response, or RES.
